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Opinion 
 
Brexit means anything but Brexit:  
Why the Prime Minister is at a crossroads and in need of a second 
referendum 
 
Thom Brooks1 
 
This Opinion engages with the Prime Minister’s claim that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ and that 
this is what she intended to deliver only to find both her party and the public abandon her 
once a plan for Brexit was published. It is argued that, if May wants Brexit in some form to 
happen, its likely content will enrage her party. Yet, if she plays to her party then her plans 
for Brexit are over. The recommended way out of this crossroads is to call a second 
referendum recognising it is the best of available options that should command support from 
Leavers and Remainers alike to bring finality and break Parliament’s deadlock. 
Key words: Brexit; Constitutional Law; European Union; Immigration 
 
‘Brexit means Brexit’ is the mantra repeatedly uttered with disciplined conviction by Prime 
Minister Theresa May since July 2016.2 This was shortly after the EU Referendum result, but 
months away from her triggering Article 50. While much has changed over the nearly three 
years since, the UK has yet to Brexit and the public are only confused further about what 
‘Brexit’ means.  
The following Opinion reflects on Brexit’s troubled beginnings which can help explain both 
May’s challenge in receiving support for her plans in Parliament and why she may have to 
choose between delivering some form of Brexit now or focus her attention on keeping her 
party united, but cannot have both. I conclude by providing a possible way out of the current 
parliamentary gridlock via a second referendum. 
 
I. Brexit means stopping UKIP 
Originally, Brexit did not mean leaving the European Union. Its political aim was not to take 
back control from Brussels, but from UKIP. In 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron took the 
helm of a Conservative-led coalition because it had failed to win a majority despite toppling 
Gordon Brown’s government. As YouGov’s Peter Kellner observed, a future Tory victory in 
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2015 required squeezing UKIP support or risk not only losing the election, ‘but suffering 
lasting damage’.3 Of course, UKIP took votes from other parties, like Labour. However, for 
every one ex-Labour voter UKIP was winning over three ex-Tory voters so the threat they 
posed was decidedly targeting the Conservatives most.4 No party had a monopoly on support 
for leaving the EU. Euroscepticism could be found in different degrees within the Tories and 
Labour although much more so in the former than the latter. The issue was not that there was 
Eurosceptics in the Conservative Party wanting out of the EU, but that those with that view 
increasingly turned to supporting UKIP instead. The political writing was on the wall for 
Cameron if he wanted to boot the Liberal Democrats out of Downing Street and run a 
coalition-free Tory government and that was to give potential voters backing UKIP a new 
reason to support the Tories. 
This new reason was the promise of an in-out EU referendum. It is worth remembering that, 
for Cameron, voting Remain was not support for the status quo. Instead, he secured a draft 
agreement on what was called an ‘emergency brake’ on EU migrants claiming in-work 
benefits for up to seven years, an opt out from the EU’s commitment to forge an ‘ever closer 
union’ and a ‘red card’ system to allow national parliaments to prevent unwanted EU laws 
from taking effect.5 This created a choice between a EU to be reformed subject to later 
confirmation versus a Brexit whose details were to be nailed down after the result. Neither 
option provided finality, only a direction of travel. 
The government’s official view was to remain in a reformed EU with ministers free to take 
opposing sides.6 This plan worked well as a political strategy to stem the tide of defecting 
Tory voters to UKIP. Cameron won a modest 12-seat majority. However, Cameron’s strategy 
was only to use a Brexit referendum to win back voters and not to leave the EU. To that end, 
his plan backfired in putting the Tories back in government but led by his successor to enjoy 
his election victory after he stepped down the day after the 2016 referendum.  
This strategy focused more on what was disliked about the EU than any benefits of 
continuing membership. Cameron’s Euroscepticism. In 2014, he claimed ‘the EU is not 
working and we will change it’.7 The EU was a problem where the UK’s membership would 
be premised on it changing to the UK’s liking. This problem extended to the aim of seeking 
the right for his government to veto European Court of Human Right judgements 
notwithstanding criticisms that leaving the EU did not strictly commit the UK to exiting the 
Court’s jurisdiction.8 
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Nevertheless, Brexit was never the goal for the government. The Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee went so far as to claim it committed an act of ‘gross negligence’ in instructing 
Whitehall to make no contingency plans for leaving the EU.9 It is as if leaving the EU was 
not the real point of the referendum after all. Sadly, this failure to plan for unwanted 
possibilities is a mistake that will be repeated again soon. 
 
II. Brexit means consolidating support to become Prime Minister 
Brexit soon transformed itself from a means to an end to prevent lost votes to UKIP to a 
means to an end to gain backbench votes to become Prime Minister. During the EU 
referendum, then Home Secretary Theresa May said ‘it is clearly in our national interest to 
remain a member of the European Union’.10 She feared ‘a loss of investors and businesses’ to 
the EU and ‘going backwards when it comes to international trade’.11  
Since Leave won and Cameron left office, May has said many things since. But it is fair to 
say that she has not changed her views about what she campaigned for, but about what is best 
since that campaign was lost. May’s support for Brexit is genuine in its reluctance. It is worth 
remembering too that her aforementioned speech concluding with her stating her wish the 
UK would remain in the EU, May had more to say of what she did not support than what she 
did. This Euroscepticism has likely contributed to May’s attempt to deliver a harder Brexit, 
including her own desire to see the UK out of the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights appealing directly to the Eurosceptic wing of her party.12 
This can be seen in one of May’s first acts over Brexit: to fight a court battle about whether 
her government could unilaterally trigger Article 50 and start the countdown to Brexit 
without Parliament’s explicit consent. The Miller case exercises many legal minds 
afterwards, but was a battle May could have easily avoided by conceding a vote and 
proceeding to a swift start to Brexit talks as she clearly wanted.13 At the time, I saw this as 
the first sign that the Prime Minister was trying to pin blame on others – perhaps the judiciary 
– for frustrating a Brexit that I predicted could not be implemented by 29 March 2019.14  
The post-Miller rush to trigger Brexit talks before confirming Cabinet agreement for how 
they would be negotiated and a plan for achieving specific outcomes can be explained either 
as a previously undisclosed enthusiasm for Brexit generally or, more likely in my view, 
achieving the aim of further consolidating her party’s support for her leadership – which has 
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held steady until recently. Brexit is once more a means to an end rather than any particular 
destination.  
 
III. Brexit means selective memory 
Since September 2018, Brexit’s meaning changed again – this time to something very 
specific in terms of a withdrawal agreement based on a selective memory of past campaign 
promises. 
Of course, the best known promise of Vote Leave was to redirect £350m per week it claimed 
was sent to the EU and instead spend it mostly on the NHS. This reflected the UK’s gross 
contribution that does not take into account Britain’s rebate of about £75m per week nor the 
amount per week the EU pays to the UK in farming subsidies and regional aid.15 
Nonetheless, this is a significant sum in the eyes of the public. What is more, the Prime 
Minister did promise that NHS spending would increase by more than £350m by 2023—24 
although this spending neither covers all health spending in England nor likely to come from 
any so-called Brexit dividend.16  
A second major promise of Boris Johnson and Michael Gove’s official Brexit campaign 
group Vote Leave was that Brexit means a new points-based immigration system.17 Nigel 
Farage, who headed unofficial Brexit campaign group Leave.EU, claimed ‘everybody who 
voted Brexit wants a points-based immigration system’.18 Both groups claimed that a points-
based immigration system was exactly what was needed to take back control of the 
immigration system after EU free movement is ended. Critics said that countries, like 
Australia, that introduced points-based immigration systems did so in order to attract more 
immigrants rather than cut numbers.  
As an immigrant to the UK and immigration expert, I found myself baffled by both sides. 
Why? Because the UK already has a points-based immigration system – and for about a 
decade.19 I should know – I received my visa through it. So, there is no points-based system 
to launch for the first time even if it is currently only used for non-EU migrants. It makes one 
wonder how little politicians making the loudest promises about immigration know about the 
system they are so eager to reform. Their points-based revolution already happened, and they 
were too busy complaining about the system to notice it.  
Referenda are not general elections: there is no requirement to publish a manifesto and hold 
those who win accountable for making good on promises they made. We know that the main 
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issues for those backing Brexit were sovereignty and immigration, but they do not by 
themselves dictate what Brexit means.20  
The Prime Minister took Brexit to mean specific things: an end to freedom of movement (and 
no points-based immigration system), an end to the ECJ’s jurisdiction and no Customs Union 
membership. Yet, FullFact.Org confirmed a lack of consistency by the Vote Leave official 
campaign that Brexit would mean exiting the Customs Union.21 Michael Gove said during 
the campaign that: ‘There is a free trade zone stretching from Iceland to Turkey that all 
European nations have access to, regardless of whether they are in or out of the euro or EU. 
After we vote to leave we will remain in the zone’ – strongly suggesting Brexit does not 
mean leaving the Customs Union.22 Another prominent campaign, Daniel Hannan MEP, said 
in the run up to the campaign ‘absolutely no one is suggesting we would give up our position 
in the free market in Europe’ suggesting Brexit did not mean leaving the Single Market 
either.23 
My point is not to hold either side to every promise made in its name. The issue is that the 
Prime Minister took Brexit to mean only a specific set of red lines not clearly supported 
consistently by those who championed Brexit – and, in rejecting a points-based system, 
claimed Brexit did not mean one of the most popularly held policy views of those who 
campaigned and voted for Brexit. Brexit means a selective memory of picking and choosing 
red lines somewhat arbitrarily – which to some degree undermines the claim that to fail to 
give full support to the implementation of every policy picked is to betray some specific 
democratically chosen set of policies for Brexit.  
 
IV. Brexit lite or Rule Brexitannia? 
Now Brexit’s meaning is in transition once more splintering off into opposing, hardened 
camps. One view of Brexit is what we might call Brexit Lite. It is where a majority seems 
most possible in seeing the UK leave the EU but remain within the Customs Union and 
possibly the Single Market. Like any lite brand, it is a less substantial substitute for the so-
called ‘real’ thing of a complete, No Deal total break. The attractiveness of Brexit Lite for its 
proponents is that it honours Brexit in name with minimal disruption in its spirit. Much might 
continue to operate as before, but Britain would be out of the EU.  
A second, opposing view is Rule Brexitannia. This represents both a firm breaking off from 
the EU and a desire to reclaim a cherished past. Both parts matter. Brexit is not merely a 
break or new beginning, but a return to greatness. Rule Brexitannians want a harder Brexit 
not to hide from the world, but to reengage like the global powerhouse we once were. 
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Neither view represents a consistently held position by either Vote Leave or Leave.EU during 
the referendum. This is not to dismiss their credibility, but to earmark them as post-Brexit 
claims about what Brexit means. 
Each sees the other as a danger. Rule Brexitannians see support for Brexit Lite as a charade 
that hamstrings Brexit’s potential paying mere lip service to the vote to leave the EU. 
Whereas Brexit Lite sees Rule Brexitannia as a reckless leap into an abyss from which it 
might take a generation or more to climb out and rebuild what was lost. 
The problem for May is that this hardening represents a deep split in her party and Leavers 
across the country. To outsiders, they appear as two different conceptions of Brexit. But for 
them, each sees itself as the Brexit that the public mandated through the referendum – with 
the other lacking that justification. This deep difference makes reconciliation difficult to find 
and each vote by Parliament against May’s plans for withdrawal saw each take different 
positions on whether to support her or not. Interestingly, May’s plan is neither isolating her 
position on what Brexit means even more. 
 
V. Brexit’s future in a second vote 
So how to move forward? Consider three options. The first is that the Conservatives change 
their leader and so the Prime Minister. However welcome this may be it does not solve 
Parliament’s gridlock because it does not change its arithmetic. A different personality 
whether more charismatic or Churchillian makes no difference to resuscitating the same deal 
struck dead more than once.  
A second option is that there is a new general election called. This is now a possibility with 
the delay of Brexit until at least Halloween. Yet, without changing or reducing May’s red 
lines, it is clear that no majority in Parliament will spook the EU into a different deal 
especially with the latter calling the shots on the Brexit timetable. Any attempt to try, try and 
try again will fail each time as May’s plan did across three votes in the House of Commons. 
The only greater folly might be for a proponent of  Rule Brexitannia to claim additional red 
lines yet expect a more generous concession in return.  
A third option might prove to be May’s best hope in an unlikely place: calling a second 
referendum. This outcome is tainted by association: namely, it has become synonymous with 
those who want to cancel Brexit as some Remainers were quick to call for another vote 
shortly after the first was counted. A second referendum has a large number of MPs behind it 
although still short of a majority.  
 But now reconsider May’s position. If a new leader or election might not push her deal past 
the parliamentary line to win a meaningful vote, a second referendum could give her 
withdrawal agreement a second life. A choice between her deal or no Brexit would command 
a majority in Parliament who, for different motivations, each have something gain from 
holding such a contest. Pro-Remain MPs would have a last attempt at blocking Brexit for 
good while pro-Leave MPs would have a final push for public support before the October 
deadline.  
The strategy carries big risks for May. If she lost, then her deal is gone and so too her time as 
Prime Minister. Yet should she win, May could achieve two aims. First, she could ‘own’ 
Brexit by leaving out No Deal and forcing pro-Leave critics to either publicly support her or 
be shown to fail to back Brexit when it was needed most. Secondly, a win would put all MPs 
under sufficiently strong political pressure to vote for her deal no matter how reluctantly – 
just as we saw MPs from all parties come out in support of triggering Article 50 
notwithstanding any concerns they held personally. A second referendum is May’s only 
viable chance at passing her deal at this time – and it would bring much needed finality to the 
Brexit debate.24 
 
VI. Conclusions 
This Opinion has taken no view about how the public should vote on Brexit or any other 
matter. It has not commented on claims the winning side told falsehoods to mislead the public 
to victory or about the impact, if any, that unlawful campaign spending might have played. 
My intention is not to suggest these issues are unimportant, but instead to draw out a 
narrative in as non-partisan a way possible – notwithstanding my serving as an advisor to 
Labour for many years (which will overshadow my analysis enough for some readers).  
Those who put Brexit on the table – Cameron in promising a referendum and May for 
triggering the Brexit talks – are not those who wanted it to happen. It is hardly surprising to 
suggest that Brexit has been used by them for goals other than leaving the European Union, 
but without doubting their sincerity in seeing through their promises. May’s claim that 
‘Brexit means Brexit’ seemed apt at the time when its meaning was still being pinned down. 
Now it seems Brexit means something different. 
 
Britain is now at a crossroads that perhaps only a second referendum might help us pass. This 
does not mean another vote will happen or that problems arising during the last campaigns 
will not return. I remain of the view that Brexit is so complex politically and legally it is 
highly unlikely to happen, at least in any of its purer forms.25 We may know by November 
whether this pessimistic, realist prediction comes true. Either way, the debate over what 
Brexit means will not end even if Brexit’s implementation does. 
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